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Abstract: We compare the social welfare generated by a domestic government in the
two types of policy setups:  a "commitment" regime in which the government sets its
policy instrument before the strategic choice is made by the domestic firm and a "non-
commitment" regime where the policy variable is set after the strategic choice is made
by the firm. The government conducts strategic trade policy in the form of optimal tariffs
under which domestic and foreign firms compete in quantities in an imperfectly
competitive domestic market where cost reducing R&D spillovers take place from the
domestic to the foreign firm.  We show that the "non-committed" government achieves
generally a higher level of welfare and levies a lower optimal tariff than the "committed"
government. Moreover, when the domestic government is allowed to use an R&D
subsidy, that may or may not be  accompanied by the optimal tariff, the resulting
optimal subsidies are always positive.
Abstrakt: ČlÆnek se zab￿vÆ srovnÆn￿m společenskØho blaha domÆc￿ země za dvou
různ￿ch obchodn￿ch politik domÆc￿ vlÆdy: politiky ￿se zÆvazkem￿, kdy vlÆda vol￿ nÆstroj
regulace obchodu dř￿ve, ne￿ firma svou strategickou veličinu, a politiky ￿bez zÆvazku￿,
kdy je tomu naopak. VlÆda reguluje obchod pomoc￿ optimÆln￿ch tarifů; firmy soutě￿￿ na
neœplně konkurenčn￿m domÆc￿m trhu v kvantitě zbo￿￿, přičem￿ dochÆz￿ k transferu
technologie redukuj￿c￿ nÆklady na v￿zkum a v￿voj  od domÆc￿ k zahraničn￿ firmě. ČlÆnek
ukazuje, ￿e politika ￿bez zÆvazku￿ vede obecně k vy￿￿￿mu společenskØmu blahu a
ni￿￿￿mu optimÆln￿mu tarifu, ne￿ politika ￿se zÆvazkem￿. Pokud mÆ domÆc￿ vlÆda1 It seems that Carmichael (1987) was the first who referred to empirical
evidence showing that in practice the government often sets its policy only after it
observes firms’ action. See also Gruenspecht (1988) and Neary (1991).
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mo￿nost dotovat v￿zkum a v￿voj domÆc￿ firmy s t￿m, ￿e takovÆ dotace mů￿e, ale
nemus￿ b￿t doprovÆzena optimÆln￿m tarifem, optimÆln￿ dotace je v￿dy pozitivn￿.  
JEL:  F13;  L11; L13; O31
Keywords: government commitment, optimal tariffs and subsides,  technological  spillovers,
first￿best versus second￿best strategic policy.
1. Introduction
As Maggi and Grossman (1998)  noted, arguments for "strategic trade policy" have not
convinced the majority of economists that the profession’s traditional support for free trade
should be abandoned, despite the theoretical attractiveness of strategic trade interventionism
and its tempting prescriptions. Until recently, this stance mostly reflected either the a priori
position of economists who argued against trade activism, (see, for instance, Baghwati, 1989;
Krugman, 1987) or was based on results obtained in "calibration" models, which indicated that
gains were at best modest when strategic trade policies are applied as profit shifting or
facilitating devices (see, for instance, Venables, 1994; and Krugman and Smith, 1994).
 Nowadays, there seems to be a third serious drawback to strategic trade theory
policies. Recently, it was pointed out  "... that governments and firms are likely to differ in their
ability to commit to future action" (Neary and Leahy, 2000). Thus, the government may lack
credibility with the firms whose behavior it tries to influence or there may be a time lag between
the announcement and the implementation of  strategic trade policies. As a consequence, the
government may be forced to select its policy only after the strategic choice has been made by
domestic firms.1 This gives a strategic motive to the domestic firm to influence (or manipulate)
the government’s policy response. Under these circumstances, it was claimed, conducting
strategic trade policy can cause inefficiencies and consequently can lead to a lower level of2See, for instance Mansfield et al. (1981) and Levine et al. (1987) for a comprehensive
empirical analysis of the causes, forms and aspects of attenuated appropriability due to inability
to capture the induced benefits of innovating activity and intellectual property. Vishwasrao
(1993),for example, refers to USITC documents (1988), reporting  aggregate losses for US
firms amounting to 23.8  billion dollars due to inadequate IPR protection. 
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social welfare compared to the corresponding social welfare under free trade (see for instance,
Karp and Perloff, 1995; Neary and O￿Sullivan,1997; Maggi and Grossman; 1998, Leahy and
Neary, 2000; Ionascu and ￿igić, 2001).
 ￿igić (2000),on the other hand, argued that in the particular case where free trade leads
to unilateral violations of intellectual property rights (IPR) via, say, R&D spillovers, efficiency and
welfare losses may be large due to the well known appropriability problem2 as well as the
somewhat less known failure of domestic firm to fully exploit economies of scale (see ￿igić,
2000). This caused strategic trade  to be strictly superior to free trade. More specifically,  ￿igić,
(2000) showed that when domestic and foreign firm compete in quantities on the domestic
market and there are IPR violations by the foreign firm, a strategic tariff reduces or completely
eliminates illegally appropriated research output and thus thwarts IPR violations. However, this
result was obtained under the recently challenged assumption that the government can commit
to its policy instrument before the domestic firms’ choice of strategy. 
The goal of this paper is to show that in a world characterized by unilateral IPR
violations and a ￿non-committed￿ government, the benefits of strategic trade policy measured
in terms of social welfare are generally greater than the social welfare obtained under the
corresponding commitment regime.  In other words, we claim that the inability of the domestic
government to commit to a tariff policy before the domestic firm’s strategic decision does not
weaken the case for strategic trade policy. On the contrary, it generally reinforces it. 
Another contribution of the recent strategic trade literature, primarily due to Neary and
Leahy (1996, 1997, 1999, 2000), stresses the distinction between "first￿best" and "second￿
best" policy. The first￿best versus second￿ best  issue arises in the context of dynamic games
where domestic firms have more than one choice variables (e.g., level of R&D and level of
output). In this setup the first￿best policy in principle includes more than one policy instrument
in order to induce socially desirable levels of all choice variables. However, in many3 The monopoly profit as a function of R&D is given by [A-+f(x)] 2/ 4 - x . The
concavity implies that its derivative and hence the function (A-a+f[x]) f’[x] decreases in
x for x0 (see Kamien et al.)
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circumstances the government may be constrained to use only one instrument (for example,
R&D subsidy). Such a constrained policy is coined  "second-best." One interesting result from
this literature is that in the case of Cournot competition, the R&D subsidy that is generally
positive in the second￿best policy turns out to be negative (R&D tax) if the first￿ best policy is
implemented. We show that this is not the case in our model and that the R&D subsidy is
always positive in both the first￿best policy and second￿best policy.
2. The model
2.1. Assumptions
Much like in ￿igić (2000), the core model is assumed to be a Cournot￿ type duopolistic
competition between a  "domestic" and a  "foreign" firm.  The domestic firm has unit costs of
production C =  - f(x), where x stands for R&D expenditures and f(x) can be viewed as an
"R&D production function" with classical properties, f(x)  , f(0) = 0, f’(x) > 0 and f’’(x) < 0. In
addition, we assume that the corresponding monopoly profit (net of the R&D expenditure) is a
strictly concave function for x 0.3 The parameter  can be thought of as pre-innovative unit
costs describing old technology initially accessible to both the domestic and the foreign  firm.
The foreign firm benefits through spillovers from R&D activity carried out by the domestic firm.
If it exports its products, the foreign firm also pays a specific tariff t per unit of production. Its
unit (pre￿tariff) cost function is c =  -  f(x) where   [0,1] denotes the level of spillovers (or,
equivalently, the level of the strength of IPR protection).
The inverse demand function in the domestic market (assumed to be linear with units
chosen such that the slope of the inverse demand function is equal to one) is P = A - Q  where
Q = qd+qf and A > . The parameter A captures the size of the market, whereas qd and qf
denote the choice variables, that is, the corresponding quantities of the domestic and the
foreign firms.
Social welfare (W) is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (S), the firm’s profit ()4There are potentially three types of strategic considerations that the domestic
government faces:  the standard "profit shifting" motive, the  government’s motive  to
counteract the domestic firm’s strategic over or underinvestment and the government￿s
motive to offset the domestic firm’s manipulatory behavior (see Neary and Leahy,
2000). 
5 For the whole scope of possible commitment patterns between the firms and
the government in a dynamic games setting, see Leahy and Neary, 1996.
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and the revenue from tariffs (R). It is important to note that in order to focus on strategic
interactions, most authors use a "third market" assumption, whereby domestic and foreign firms
compete on a common export market. As a  consequence, only the domestic firm￿s profit (net
of subsidy) enters the social welfare function (see for instance, Karp and Perloff, 1995; Neary
and O￿Sullivan,1997; Leahy and Neary, 2000). Thus, our welfare function is more
comprehensive and so the task of the domestic government is not constrained  to deal only with
strategic interactions4 but also to take into account and to influence (if possible) the impact of
the domestic firm’s strategic choices on consumer surplus and tariff revenue. 
As is already clear, the key assumption is that the government enacts the tariff only after
it observes the domestic firm￿s choice of R&D. This government policy we coin the "non-
commitment" regime and the associated variables have the attached subscript "nc". On the
other hand, the "commitment regime" implies that the government is capable of committing
inter￿temporally to a tariff prior to the domestic firm￿s choices of R&D. This policy regime was
discussed in ￿igić,(2000) and the associated variables  carry the subscript "c". Finally, note that
both "nc" and "c" regimes are in fact the second-best policies since there is only one policy
instrument and two choice variables (R&D and quantities).5
2.2. The game
We consider a sequential (threeSstage) game. In the first stage, the domestic firm
chooses strategically its R&D investment taking into account its subsequent impact on both its
foreign rival￿s behaviour and on the  government￿s choice of  tariff. That is, the non-committed
government sets the tariff on imports only after it observes the firm￿s choice of R&D. The
rational domestic firm anticipates this tariff since it is ex post optimal for the welfare maximizing





last stage, the firms select quantities, and consequently, profits and welfare are realised.
Alternatively, we can, following Neary and Leahy (2000), adopt a two￿stage framework in which
the government in the second stage of the game is able to commit only intra￿temporally, setting
its policy instrument, tariff, before the firms choose the quantities. Then, in the first stage the
domestic firm selects its R&D investment.
We concentrate on the domestic market (alternatively, we may impose a segmented
market hypothesis),  with duopoly assumed to be a viable market form both before and after
the tariff is set. We proceed by solving the game backwards. In the last (third) stage, the firms
choose the equilibrium quantities. The domestic firm maximizes
given qf .
The first￿order condition for an interior maximum is d/qd = 0 and yields A - 2qd - q f - C =
0.
The optimization problem for the foreign firm yields:
given qd and t. The first-order condition is  A - 2qf - qd - c - t = 0. Solving the reaction functions
yields the Cournot outputs as a function of R&D investment:






of R&D investment and tariff:
In the second stage of the game, the domestic government selects the optimal tariff
given the R&D expenditure of the domestic firm. Its objective function is given by the expression
W*(t) = *(t) + S*(t) + R*(t)  (4)
where S*(t) and R*(t) are respectively given by
and
It seems natural to assume that the function R(t) is concave in t, initially increasing as t goes
above zero but eventually falling to zero as t reaches the prohibitive tariff, tp (a tariff that causes
the exit of the foreign firm). Thus, the whole tariff domain on which duopoly is defined is given
by the interval t[0,tp].
Assuming an interior maximum, the optimal tariff, tnc* is obtained by solving dW/dt =
0, yielding: 
Finally, in the first stage of the game, the domestic firm selects the optimal level of R&D
by substituting  tnc* into (3) to obtain 6 The second order condition requires
7 The set of R&D actions is given by X where x  X = [0,x
] and x
 is the solution
of the equation  - f(x) = 0. We assume that  is large enough that the optimal R&D is always




Maximizing (8) with respect to R&D investment gives the first order condition6 and (implicitly)
the optimal7 xnc*  :
Note that the optimal R&D level could be obtained more elegantly and more intuitively by
comparing the marginal cost and benefits of an increase in x. A small increase of x affects
positively the subsequent government tariff by t/x. This in turn, increases profit by /t. In
addition, a given increase in x also increases the domestic firm￿s profit directly by /x. The
associated cost of such an increase in x is one. Thus, the optimal xnc* is found at the point
where the marginal benefit of an increase in R&D is equal to its marginal costs, that is, where
/t t/x + /x  = 1 holds. This  expression describes the same first order condition (9).
3.  Tariffs, R&D and  Welfare in the Two Regimes
3.1. Optimal tariff
Before moving to a comparison of relevant variables in the two regimes, we first show
that the optimal tariff is indeed positive. This can been checked by evaluating the  impact of a
tariff on social welfare. We begin with the optimal tariff in the commitment regime where
marginal social welfare is given by (see ￿igić, 2000) :    8 A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this result to hold is that there be
a "positive terms of trade effect," which, in this context, means that the new equilibrium




Summing up the direct marginal impacts of the tariff on the domestic firm’s profit and consumer
surplus yields nc*/t + Snc*/t = (f(x*)(1-)+t)/3 > 0. Since the indirect effect of the tariff (via
R&D) on consumer surplus, S*/x dx*c/dt, is always non￿negative (see ￿igić, 2000 for the
proof), this unambiguously implies dWc*(t=0)/dt >0. This is in accord with the standard wisdom
in strategic trade theory which claims that, given duopolistic Cournot competition between
foreign and domestic firms, imposing a "low" tariff is beneficial  in terms of social welfare under
fairly general conditions (see Helpman and Krugman, 1989).8 
The proof that Wnc*(t=0)/dt >0 is even simpler because in the non-commitment regime
the government sets the tariff only after the home firm sets its R&D, so the analogue to (10) is
given by (11):
Of course, the fact that the optimal tariff in the non-commitment regime is positive can be  seen
by a visual inspection of expression (7). 
In fact, the more relevant question in this setup is whether the optimal tariff is in the
interior of set t[0,tp] since it may easily be the case that the optimal tariff is exactly at  tp or
even beyond it (see ￿igić, 2000). The only force that may preserve the duopoly as the optimal
market structure is tariff revenue, the benefits of which have to exceed the foregone gains
stemming from the lower unit costs brought on by a tariff at or beyond tp. This, in turn, requires
certain restrictions upon the R&D production function, f(x). Namely, the efficiency of f(x),
captured by its underlying parameters (and  first and second derivatives) should not be "too
large" (see ￿igić, 2000).
3.2. Preliminary discussion
The domestic firm’s profit is monotonically increasing in tariff on the whole domain9 Note that (12) gives only an implicit tariff since  f[xc*]  =f[ x*(t)] is an implicit
function of the tariff.
10 It is interesting to note that both  tc* and  tnc* have the function of countering
the IPR violation since an increase in  that measures an increase in the IPR violation




t[0,tp] (/t>0 from (3)) since an increase in the tariff has the same effect as an increase in
the competitor’s unit cost. In the present context, the domestic firm can influence the magnitude
of the tariff by means of R&D investment. Since the optimal tariff is positively affected by an
increase in R&D (t/x>0 from (7)), the domestic firm has an incentive (not present in the case
of the committed government) to invest strategically in R&D in order to induce a higher tariff and
so harm its competitor. Thus, we may expect that this new, additional strategic incentive leads
to generally higher R&D by the domestic firm than in the case when there is a government
commitment. Indeed it is easy to show that evaluating R&D in the commitment regime at tariff
tnc*, results in xnc*  xc* (tnc*). However, the tariffs are generally different in the two regimes
since the non-committed government has an incentive to adopt a lower tariff than the committed
government. The reason for this is that now the tariff does not have a "technological function"
since R&D investments are already in place when the tariff is set. Contrary to this, the
committed government that sets the tariff, tc*, (see expression (12) which is the solution of
(10)9) takes into account the tariff’s impact on the subsequent choice of R&D that is below the
(first￿best) social optimum, and so tc*, besides its profit shifting role, also has the function of
stimulating R&D investment (see ￿igić, 2000):
The impact of a tariff on the subsequent R&D investment is captured by the term x’ f’(x) (where
x￿   dxc*/dt  and f’(x)  f(x)/x). Note that when x’ = 0, tc* collapses to tnc*. Thus, in the
absence of an R&D subsidy, the tariff,  tc*, assumes part of the R&D subsidy￿s role and acts
not only as a trade policy but also as an industrial or technological policy instrument. As we
saw, the optimal tariff, tnc*, does not have this role.10 11
(13)
A rigorous proof that  tc*  tnc* is not possible with a general form of the R&D
production function, but  the left hand sides of the two first order conditions for welfare
maximization in commitment and non-commitment regimes (that is, dWnc*/dt and dWc*/dt
given by the expressions 10 and 11) can serve as a rough indication of the relative magnitudes
of the corresponding tariffs. The terms that appear in the expression of dWc*/dt but not in
dWnc*/dt are 
The first term describes the impact of R&D on the consumer surplus caused by an increase in
the tariff and is always positive (see ￿igić, 2000). The sign of the second term dealing with the
impact of x on tariff revenue is not a priori clear but the first term always dominates the second
so (13) is always positive (see Appendix 1). However, note that the two expressions, dWnc*/dt
and dWc*/dt, cannot be directly compared since each is evaluated at a different optimal value
of R&D and consequently at different optimal quantities. Nevertheless, the additional positive
terms in dWc*/dt that do not figure in dWnc*/dt suggest that the accompanying tariff, tc* is
higher than tnc*.
Presumably, the lower tariff and generally larger R&D in the case of a non-committed
government would lead to higher welfare in general in the non-commitment regime, that is
Wnc* Wc*. It is possible to prove this conjecture only in the case of a concrete functional form
for the R&D production function. As in ￿igić (2000), we use the functional form: f(x) = (g x)
2
where the parameter g explicitly captures R&D efficiency  (see also Chin and Grossman, 1991).
As shown in ￿igić (2000), for a duopoly to be an equilibrium market structure, it cannot
be optimal for the domestic firm to pursue strategic predation, (a strategy that leads to the
elimination of the foreign competitor) in either of the two regimes. As already mentioned, this
requirement puts certain restrictions on the R&D production function. In particular, R&D
investment is assumed to be not ￿too efficient￿ or alternatively, overinvestment in R&D,
sufficient to induce exit of the foreign firm, should not be profitable. Technically, the best
response of the foreign firm should be such that qf
*  0 holds in equilibrium. Moreover, it is also11 Note that the highest sensible tariff is the one at which the domestic firm
would achieve an unconstrained monopoly position. We label this tariff as tm (see ￿igić,
2000), so the range of prohibitive tariffs is given by  t[tp,tm].
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(14)
assumed that it is never optimal for the government to erect a prohibitive tariff, that is a tariff
higher than or equal to a critical level, (labelled as tp ), which is just sufficient to eliminate the
competitor from the market.11
The set of parameters consistent with profit and welfare maximization in both regimes
is displayed in Figure 1 as a shaded area.  Solving the equation qf*(.) = 0 in the commitment
regime for the threshold level of R&D efficiency (denoted gcr) defines a gcr curve: 
Finally, comparison of Wc*(t*) with the welfare obtained under the domestic monopoly
gives the other critical curve gcc (see Appendix 1). The line gcc is relevant only if  > 2 since




Figure  1. The
region of
parameters (g < gcr and g < gcc) consistent with the duopolistic    competition in both
regimes. 
  < 2. A similar procedure was performed for the non-commitment regime but since it gave
the broader regions of the parameters, the intersections of the two feasible regions coincide
with the feasibility region of the commitment regime.
3.3. Tariffs comparison in the two regimes
When f(x) = (g x)
2, the corresponding levels of tariffs in the two regimes are given by
and
Lemma 1
tnc* <  tc*  for all g > 0 and all   0.12  The fact that dtnc*/dg> 0 for >0 should not be interpreted as implying the
technological function of the tariff, tnc*, since this is only a passive increase in the tariff





See Appendix  2. 
As already mentioned (see footnote 10), when spillovers are strictly positive, the tariff,
tnc*, among other things, serves as an instrument to counteract IPR violations. However,
without spillovers (  = 0), (15) collapses to (15.1)
and the optimal tariff becomes a pure, profit shifting tariff (see Bhattacharjea 1995). (Note also
that the more general expression for the tariff,  tnc*, given by (7)  reduces to 15.1 when  = 0).
Thus, the tariff, tnc*, can have two roles at best: profit shifting and countering an IPR violation
if  >0.
We now turn to the optimal tariff when the government can make a commitment, tc*.
Unlike tnc*, this tariff has an additional technological function aimed at boosting R&D
investment. This function is clearly seen if we evaluate (16) at  = 0 to get
and observe that dtc*/dg > 0.12
Finally, both (15) and (16) reduce to pure, profit shifting tariffs when  = g = 0. 
3.4. Comparison of R&D levels in the two regimes




The relationship between the two R&D levels is a bit less clear-cut than between the
corresponding tariff levels. The reasons for this have already been discussed. On the one hand,
the domestic firm in the non-commitment regime has a strategic motive to overinvest in order
to induce a higher tariff and this motive is not present in the commitment regime. On the other
hand, however, the ability of the government to commit before R&D is in place enables the
government to influence the level of R&D. As it turns out, the presence or absence of spillovers
is a decisive factor in determining whether xnc* is bigger or lower than xc*.
Lemma 2 
xnc* > xc*  provided that the level of spillovers exceeds a threshold level r (g).
Proof: See Appendix 3
More precisely, when spillovers are zero or very small, xc* > xnc*, holds, but as soon as
a certain relatively low level of  is reached, the reverse is  true. This suggests that  xnc*
declines more slowly than xc* as the level of spillovers increases. Indeed, this holds already
from the level  = 0 (see Appendix 3). The intuition for this is that the  firm in a non-commitment
regime, which has an additional motive to overinvest (to induce a higher tariff), is less sensitive
to spillovers than the firm in the commitment regime which does not have this motive.
3.5. Welfare comparison in the two regimes
The above discussion of tariffs and R&D levels in the two regimes was in fact only a
prelude (although an insightful one) to the key comparison of relative welfare. Similarly to the
case of R&D, it can be shown that Wnc* > Wc* as long as certain critical levels of g and  are
reached (see Appendix 4).13It is easy to check that tariff revenue increases in x provided that  >1/2.
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Proposition 1
The social welfare in the "non-commitment" regime exceeds the social welfare in the
"commitment" regime as soon as spillovers exceed the critical level, w. Consequently, for 
> w (g), social welfare in the "non-commitment" regime is always higher than the welfare in
the corresponding free trade world.
 
Proof: See Appendix 4
As seen from Figure 2, it is sufficient that, independently of the value of the efficiency
parameter, g, the level of spillovers exceeds a small threshold level (that is, Max[w(g)])=0.039)
in order for Wnc* > Wc* to hold. Notably, this critical level is even smaller than in the case of
R&D implying that a sufficient condition for Wnc* > Wc*  is  xnc* >xc*. This is not surprising
once we realized that social welfare is an increasing function of R&D investment at either of the
optimal levels xnc* and xc*. In other words, the marginal social benefit exceeds the marginal
social costs at x* (where ￿x*￿ stands for either xnc* or xc*). Thus, a ￿small￿ increase in x beyond
x* generates more social welfare by increasing consumer surplus than the resulting social
welfare loss due to the fall in the firm￿s profit and a possible decline in tariff revenue.13  To
prove this, note that a positive marginal welfare (that is, dW*(x*)/dx > 0), requires that the
marginal impact of R&D on consumer surplus and tariff revenue at point x* has to be positive.
In other words,  dS*(x*)/dx  + dR*(x*)/dx > 0 has to hold in both regimes in order to have
dW*(x*)/dx > 0. (Note that d*(x*)/dx = 0 by the first order condition of profit maximizing in each
regime.) Thus, in the non-commitment regime we get  
By the same token,  dWc* (xc*)/dx > 0 holds as well (see ￿igić, 2000). 
However, it is interesting that Wnc* dominates Wc* at lower levels of R&D than in the17
Figure 2. The region of parameters (g < gcr and g < gw) for which  Wnc* > Wc*
commitment regime. Intuitively, this has to be attributed to the lower tariff in the non-
commitment regime and consequently to its smaller distortionary effects. Namely, the lower
optimal tariff in the non-commitment regime is expected to have less distortional effect on
consumer surplus and tariff revenue although the domestic firm would welcome a higher tariff.
Thus, the first two effects dominate the third one as soon as   > w(g).
To summarise, the common wisdom that a committed government is able to achieve a
higher level of welfare than its non-committed counter￿part proves correct in the absence of
spillovers. However, if spillovers exceed a small critical level of w(g), the reverse is true. The
summary of the empirical work on spillovers by Griliches (1992) finds that typical values of 
range between 0.2 and 0.4, far above any possible value of w(g). Thus, the proposition that
a non-committed government can generate higher welfare in the prevalence of spillovers can
be considered as a  general case.
4. The first best policy
We now turn to first-best policy considerations. Since in our second-best setup the key
strategic variable￿ R&D investment￿ is undersupplied, the principle objective of the first best




purpose would be an R&D subsidy to the domestic firm. Thus, the relevant framework is now
a four-stage game that adds one initial stage to the game considered in the previous section:
a government commitment to a level of R&D subsidy. Again, we can, following Neary and Leahy
(2000), consider  this  game as basically a two￿stage game where in both stages the
government is restrained to commit intra-temporally; thus, in the first stage the government
selects an R&D subsidy before the domestic firm chooses its level of R&D, whereas in the
second stage the government commits to the tariff before the firms choose their quantities.
Since the rest of the game is already solved, we turn immediately to the first stage and to the
government￿s choice of optimal subsidy.
The objective function of the government that conducts the first best policy is now given
by the expression (19):
where "fb"’stands for the "first best" and "s" denotes the subsidy. The domestic firm￿s profit has
now an additional term stemming from its subsidy income,  I  s x.  The social marginal cost of
raising a unit of subsidy is assumed to be one, and so the cost of a subsidy payment for the
government is  T  s x.
Differentiating (19) with respect to the subsidy and using the domestic firm’s first order
condition, (envelope theorem) yields
By equating (20) to zero and noting that */s = x*, we get expression (21) for the optimal
first￿best subsidy:




dominates the possible negative impact (which occurs only if  <2) on tariff revenue. In other
words, the right hand side of (21) has to be positive. Indeed, substituting the relevant values
obtained by differentiating expressions (5) and (6) into (21) gives
Clearly, the optimal subsidy is positive, stimulating investments in R&D. Moreover, as seen from
(21), the optimal subsidy removes the distortion between the privately and socially desirable
R&D investment levels ensuing investment to be at the social optimal level, xs*.
The optimal, first best  tariff is given by
which obviously has the same functional form as the tariff in the non-commitment regime since
the tariff is no longer an instrument supporting R&D investment.  However, as long as  > 0, the
optimal subsidy exhibits (at least indirectly) a profit shifting role by affecting the optimal tariff
through R&D investment. (Note that when   = 0, R&D has no impact on the optimal tariff and
once again the tariff has only a profit shifting role). Thus, in the presence of spillovers, the clear
division of labor between the two instruments is somewhat blurred. This seems to be a robust
finding since a similar phenomenon was also noticed by Leahy and Neary (1999) in a different
framework with spillovers and international competition.
We now turn to the calculation of the optimal, first- best subsidy and tariff when f(x) =
(g x)
2. Substituting (g x)
2 into the expressions (22) and (23) respectively, we obtain the
expressions for the optimal subsidy and tariff: 14 Note that when spillovers exceed a certain critical level, the investment in
R&D makes the domestic firm ￿soft￿ calling for a ￿puppy dog￿ strategy (see Fudenberg
and Tirole, 1984). 
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It is interesting to note that the optimal subsidy is increasing in the level of spillovers. This may
seem counter￿intuitive at first glance since for a larger  and x , the larger would be the R&D
output appropriated by the foreign firm. R&D subsidies are, however, an industrial policy
instrument with a primary role of enhancing socially insufficient R&D investment, while the other
instrument (the optimal tariff)  has (among other roles) an IPR violation offsetting role (note that
dtfb*/d > 0). Since the optimal R&D subsidy increases with spillovers, it also triggers an
increase in the tariff that thwarts research output appropriated by the foreign firm, defined as
F[xs*(s),t]     f(xs*) qf*(xs*, t), by diminishing the optimal output of the foreign firm. Moreover,
as long as spillovers are ￿not too high,￿ the investment in R&D makes the domestic firm "tough"
and the increase in R&D induced by an R&D subsidy directly reduces the research output
appropriated by the foreign firm through the reduction in the optimal output of the foreign firm.14
This lead us to the last proposition.
Proposition 2
The optimal, first– best subsidy, s*, is always positive, irrespective of the level of spillovers and
irrespective of whether R&D investment makes the domestic firm "tough" or "soft." 
Larger spillovers mandate larger R&D subsidies even if the beneficiaries are foreign, not
because the home government cares about foreign profits, but because it wishes to offset the
negative disincentives to investment arising from non-appropriability (see Leahy and Neary,
1999) and because it aims to spur better exploitation of scale economies by the domestic firm15However, this is not the case any more if the foreign firm also invests in R&D.
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(see ￿igić, 2000). The difference from the standard results in Cournot competition where
first￿best subsidy is negative (i.e., an R&D tax is optimal) stems primarily from the different
specification of the welfare function. If we neglect consumer surplus and tariff revenue, then as
is clear from (21) the optimal subsidy will be zero.15 The reason for this is that in a such
situation both the firm and the government have the same ability to commit so the firm can
achieve the most advantageous strategic position on its own (see also Neary and Leahy, 2000).
Finally, we briefly comment on an ￿R&D subsidy only￿ second-best policy since this or
a similar setup is discussed at length elsewhere (see for instance, Spencer and Brander, 1983;
Bagwell and Staiger, 1994; Maggi, 1996; and Leahy and Neary, 1997). In the absence of a tariff,
expression (21), characterizing the optimal subsidy, reduces to: 
indicating that s*sb is larger than s*fb since the remaining effects in (21), that is, the indirect
impact of  R&D on tariff revenue and consumer surplus and the direct effect of R&D on tariff
revenue are negative in sum. Indeed, calculating the explicit second￿best tariff when f(x) =   
(g x)
2 yields
This is in line with findings emphasising the robustness of the R&D subsidy (see for instance,
Brander,1995; Bagwell and Staiger,1994; Leahy and Neary 1997; Hinloopen,1997; and Neary
and Leahy, 2000) since the R&D subsidy has to boost the inefficient R&D investment and act
as a surrogate for the unavailable  tariff. 
5. Conclusion
We analyzed the effect of different degrees of government commitment on social welfare22
in a duopoly game where domestic and foreign firms compete in quantities on the imperfectly
competitive domestic market and there are R&D spillovers from the domestic to the foreign firm.
More specifically, we distinguish between "commitment" and "non-commitment" policy regimes
where a ￿committed" government selects the policy instrument before the strategic choice of the
domestic firm while its "non-committed" counterpart sets the policy instrument only after the
strategic variable of the domestic firm is already in place. The latter presumes only the
government￿s intra-temporal commitment (and consequently, the absence of its inter-temporal
commitment).
Concerning government policy, we made a distinction between the "first￿best" and
"second￿best" policy.  The first best policy in principle includes more than one policy instrument
in order to induce socially desirable levels of all choice variables. In many circumstances,
however, the government may be constrained to a smaller number of policy instruments than
the number of targets. Such a constrained policy enviroment is called  a "second￿best" policy
world.  In particular, there may be only one instrument at the government’s disposal. Since, in
our context, the domestic firm has two choice variables￿ the level of R&D investment and the
quantities to be produced￿ the second￿best policy implies either an R&D subsidy or import
tariff (but not both of them). 
As for  the second￿best policy when import tariffs are the only instrument, we showed
that when R&D spillovers prevail, social welfare in the non-commitment regime is higher than
social welfare in the commitment regime and, consequently, higher than the corresponding
welfare under a free trade regime. The reason for this  result is that the optimal tariff in the non-
committed regime is lower than the optimal tariff in the committed regime creating a smaller
distortional effect on consumer surplus and tariff revenue. The benefits of the latter exceed the
forgone benefits in the domestic firm￿s profit due to the higher tariff as soon as a small critical
level of spillovers is surpassed. A sufficient condition for social welfare in the non￿commitment
regime  to dominate is that  the domestic firm￿s strategic variable￿ R&D investment ￿ is higher
than in the commitment regime. In effect, the domestic firm in the non-committed regime has
an additional motive to overinvest in order to induce a higher tariff from the government and this
additional motive makes it less sensitive to R&D spillovers. Its R&D investment, therefore23
decreases more slowly as spillovers rise, exceeding the R&D investment from the commitment
regime as soon as a certain low spillover threshold level is exceeded.
As for the optimal subsidy, we demonstrated that it is always positive in both the first￿
best and second￿best policy setup irrespective of the level of spillovers and consequently
independent of whether the investment makes the domestic firm soft or tough. The reason for
this is the socially inefficiently level of the private R&D due to the appropriability problem that
the subsidy aims to correct and due to the scale economies that larger R&D investment brings
about. The role of the optimal subsidy in the first best setup is somewhat blurred due to R&D
spillovers since, besides its primary role to correct for the socially insufficient R&D, the first-best
subsidy also affects the optimal tariff and thus, at least indirectly, has a profit shifting role.
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Appendix 1:
In situations characterized by  > 2, g < gcr is a necessary, but by no means a sufficient
condition for duopoly to be the social welfare-maximizing market structure.
Social welfare in the commitment regime is labelled as  W*c  while social welfare in the
situation when the domestic firm is an unconstrained monopolist is given by W*m where 
The values of  and g for which W*m  W*c lead us, after some simple algebraic
manipulation of the above inequality, to the following inequality:
Turning this inequality into an equation and solving explicitly for g gives us the value
gcc(). The explicit expression for gcc() is extremely messy and therefore will not be
reproduced here in the text. Thus, if g > gcc(), the monopoly welfare exceeds the welfare from
duopoly.
Appendix 2:
Solving tc* - tnc* = 0 for the critical value of gt() yields
where gt() represents an upper border below which  tnc* <  tc*. However, as seen from Figure
1A, gt() > gcr() for all  [0,1] where25




















represents an upper border below  which xnc* > xc*. Adding the upper contour of the duopoly
feasibility region, gcr(), shows that there is a non-empty intersection for which (shaded area
in Figure 2A) xc* > xnc*.  The critical value of the r(g) is obtained by inverting the function








both xc* and xnc*
monotonically decline in , however, xnc* declines more slowly over the whole range of [0,1].
Appendix 4:
Solving Wnc* -Wc* = 0 for the critical value of gw() implies28
Figure 3A
To get the critical value gw() that depicts the upper border below which Wnc* > Wc*, it is
necessary to solve the following equation for g:
Since the solution is extremely messy, it will not be reproduce in the text. The graphical
representation of the gw() and gcr() yields a small shaded area for which  Wc* > Wnc*. The
critical value of w (g) is obtained by inverting gw(). Note that irrespectively of the value of g,
Wnc* > Wc*  for any  such that  > 1
w where  1
w = 0.03909. The graphical representation
of Wnc*, Wc* and  Wft* (social welfare in a free trade regime) is given in Figure 4A below.  29
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